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Introduction
On February 14, 2012, at the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle in Jakarta, 
dozens of pro-democracy, feminists and LGBT-rights activists staged a rally 
to call for the disbandment of the hard line Islam Defenders Front (FPI) with 
a slogan: “Indonesia Tanpa FPI2” (Indonesia without FPI). The rally was held 
in response to a series of violent attacks spearheaded by FPI members against 
the followers of Ahmadiyah, a minor Islamic denomination deemed heretical 
by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulema Council). The political 
consolidation and arrangements for the rally were made on Twitter after social 
media users introduced the hashtag #IndonesiaTanpaFPI. The hashtag trended 
swiftly, as it was used as a keyword for multiple politico-religious discourses 
on the plight of the Ahmadiyahs involving the urban middle class in Jakarta 
and other major cities. In a symbolic move, the protestors showcased a mock 
gift with a satirical message: “Valentine Gift for Habib Riziq, the Leader of 
FPI.” Their demand, however, was clear: the government should disband 
the FPI, for the group had betrayed the state ideology of Pancasila and the 
principle of Bhineka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity).  
1. Department of Anthropology, University of Indonesia.
2. The FPI (Front Pembela Islam) is a militia or vigilante group founded in 1998 by Habib Riziq 
Shihab (Feillard & Madinier 2011).
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A few weeks later, on March 9, 2012, another rally was staged by a different 
group at the same location to counter the JIL3-led movement. This rally was initiated 
by social media users who were deeply concerned by the growing popularity of 
the #IndonesiaTanpaFPI campaign, which they viewed as a sign of the growing 
clout of JIL activists and their religious views in the public sphere. They later 
promoted a new counter hashtag: #IndonesiaTanpaJIL (IndonesiawithoutJIL). 
#IndonesiaTanpaJIL supporters are different from typical Muslim activists. 
Those who took part in the rally denouncing JIL were independent artists —punk 
and trashmetal musicians— and young urban entrepreneurs who met online to 
challenge the #IndonesiaTanpaFPI movement.4 One of the most prominent figures 
from this group was Akmal Syafril5, who delivered a speech explaining why they 
needed to hold a counter rally and launch the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL movement. 
“JIL activists are currently playing a dominant role on the Internet. Every day, Indonesian 
youth read their tweets. One of [JIL activists] told us that a kiss between a [Muslim] woman 
and man is not forbidden during fasting. The other said that a kiss is just like alms. Another 
JIL activist, Guntur Romli, said that Islam is an oplosan.6 Do we need to remain passive 
against this movement? Their action in cyber world has prompted Indonesian youth to stand 
up to defend their religion. Students, musicians, Muslim activists, and even housewives 
are now aware of how dangerous they are. The culmination of their movement occurred 
on February 14, 2012, when they all stood here at the same place with only 40 people 
that include transvestites, sinners and pornography supporters. The media said the people 
of Indonesia rejected the FPI. Are all Indonesian people transvestites? Is it true that all 
Indonesians are pornography activists? We should say no to JIL. Allahu Akbar!! Disband 
JIL!! Indonesia without JIL!!”
3. JIL is an abbreviation for Jaringan Islam Liberal, a civil-society organization created to 
promote a space of dialogue about Islamic values and liberal interpretations of Islam in 
Indonesia. It was created by a young generation of scholars who were familiar with the agenda 
of democracy and the rights of minority groups. The members of this organization are strongly 
connected with previous famous inclusive Islamic intellectuals such as former presidents 
Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholis Madjid.
4. My first impression upon seeing their rally was that they represented different social 
backgrounds compared to other Islamic activists, marked by their appearance and casual 
manner in contrast with Forum Umat Islam and the FPI who happened to be at the same rally. 
As soon I had the chance to interview a few members involved in the first public demonstration 
afterward, they acknowledged that they came from different professions in Jakarta, including 
rock musician, film artist, event organizer, students, and clothing design entrepreneurs. This 
was confirmed as well during my discussion at the first national congress of this movement at 
Cikole Lembang in 2012.
5. Akmal Syafril was born in Jakarta in 1981. He has a Civil Engineering educational 
background from the Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB). He said during the interview that 
he was only occasionally involved with student Islamic movements. In 2007, he received a 
scholarship from Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII) and the Badan Amil Zakat National 
Foundation to continue his master’s degree at Universitas Ibnu Khaldun, Bogor. He wrote a 
thesis entitled “Studi Komparatif antara Pluralisme Agama dengan Konsep Hubungan Antar 
Umat Beragama dalam Pemikiran Buya Hamka” (Comparative Study of Religious Pluralism 
with Inter-Religious community of Buya Hamka.” After completing his master’s degree, he 
has been a contributor to various Islamic journals promoting his ideas of the critique of Liberal 
Islam at numerous events.
6. Oplosan is a metaphor used by JIL activists to describe religion as a mixture of various 
influences. Colloquially, it usually refers to liquors that are mixed with chemical substances.
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Following the counter-demonstration, the #IndonesiaTanpaJILhashtag7 
was massively disseminated via social media and during the following 
weeks similar rallies, also organized via social media, were held in other 
cities such as Bandung, Bogor, and Makassar. In March 2013, the Indonesian 
Bigots Community (Komunitas Bigot-Bigot Indonesia8) and One Finger 
Community, both started to be active on social media,9 creating a Twitter 
account, @TanpaJIL, to serve as their main propaganda tool. Surprisingly, 
while the #IndonesiaTanpaFPI discourse slowly faded on Twitter, the 
#IndonesiaTanpaJIL discourse gained more attention in the following months. 
In a day, almost 3,000 people joined the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL group page. Over 
the next seven months, this page managed to get 33,048 members who were 
regularly updated about all the Indonesia Tanpa JIL activities. The Twitter 
account at the time had 15,041 followers. 
The emergence of #IndonesiaTanpaJIL has strong connections with the long 
history of fragmentation and ideological rivalries between Islamic groups in 
Indonesia. #IndonesiaTanpaFPI, supported by JIL activists, is a movement which 
genealogically could be traced to the liberal and inclusive Islamic movement 
of the 1980s that was strongly associated with Nadhlatul Ulama, the largest 
Muslim organization in Indonesia. The other, #IndonesiaTanpaJIL is influenced 
by the radical ideas of one of the currents of thought claiming Masyumi heritage, 
and by its contemporary ideological progeny such as Dewan Dakwah Islamiah 
Indonesia, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or the Justice and Prosperous Party, and 
other emerging trans-national Islamic movements such as the Salafist and 
Hizbut Tahrir movements. #IndonesiaTanpaJIL is the latest form of the Islamic 
movement, taking its place in the long history of political contestation over the 
role of the religious in the public sphere in Indonesia.
Born into the world of social media, this latest generation of Indonesian 
Muslim activists has taken on a new cultural form. Regardless of their religious 
convictions—some of them were Salafists and members of the Tarbiyah 
Movement—they have been able to use popular culture and other Western 
social forms that were commonplace in social media and urban public spaces 
in Indonesia. Even though the main discourse of their slogans was similar 
to that of typical radical Muslims (that Muslims are now facing the threat of 
7. Hashtag is a feature on Twitter that enables users to create coding of their tweets by using 
the symbol “#” as the first character in front of their name code. It is used to make it easier for 
Twitter users to find trending topics on social media websites.
8. KBBI (Komunitas Bigot-Bigot Indonesia) is a group that originated in online discussions, 
mainly on Twitter. The main topic of their discussions is the threat of the Liberal Islam Network 
or JIL and how it affects the beliefs of the Indonesian Muslim community or ummah. It was 
established in 2010 and later, in 2012, several of its members joined the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL 
movement.
9. In this context, “social media” refers to all kinds of digital technology that connects people 
via the Internet and enables them to share information from text, visual, and audio resources. In 
this study I focus on Twitter, Facebook, blogs, websites and YouTube.
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Zionism and Western-secular forces in Indonesia), they articulated it in a more 
attractive way by wearing fashionable T-shirts, promoting their slogans in 
English and even wearing jeans while listening to hip-hop music, rather than 
wearing Arabic-style robes and listening to nasyid (Islamic gospel songs). 
These transversal cultural symbols, along with the accompanying discourse, 
have become the hallmark of a new kind of Islamic movement in Indonesia. 
Islamic movements that appeared in many public demonstrations reflected 
a changing form of political Islam in Indonesia: in response to the political 
changes and the weakening of Islamic parties, they decided to alter their 
political articulation to the public sphere. Presently, there are alternative 
channels to articulate Islamic discourse such as the internet and public 
demonstrations that have been localized in particular cities and in certain class 
segments. This phenomenon was influenced by the development of media 
technology, which has increased rapidly over the past ten years. It is also 
closely linked to the emerging post-authoritarian era of cultural autonomy and 
the open access to media and infrastructures in order to promote one’s ideology 
in new mass media. Further, the significant changes, which are the foundation 
of this article, also mark the era of popular Islam and the considerable trend 
of accelerated mixing of popular-culture commercialization and conservative 
Islam in Indonesia (Fealy & White 2008; van Bruinessen 2013), which reveals 
a new conservative piety that has taken on a Western cultural form. 
In contemporary Indonesia, the rise of Islamic movements in social media 
is marked by the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL hashtag which is heavily influenced by 
the new era of internet-based propaganda and discourses. Created in 2013 and 
following a similar movement in a large part of the world such as Spain, Tunisia, 
Egypt, and also America (Lim 2012) this social movement is an exemplary 
case of the use of media technology, printed matter, and popular culture to 
adapt to the changing landscape of mass media infrastructure among religious 
groups and to produce religious audiences (Hirschkind 2006; Hirschkind & 
Larkin 2008; Meyer & Moors 2006; Salvatore 2007). Their appearance on 
the social media scene brings forward former Islamist propaganda as their 
main discourse, since they still link their micro-blog discourse with Islamist 
websites, whether they have Salafist, Tarbiyah, or other Islamist ideological 
affiliations. But these historical roots also have their own ruptures since they 
also interact with the context of the changing public sphere in the social media 
landscape of Indonesia, which requires them to incorporate the new style 
of propaganda. In this context, this social movement is strongly related to 
the influences of popular culture and the new middle-class reader, who was 
previously not frequently involved in Islamist politics in Indonesia.
The growing social apprehension toward liberal interpretations of Islam 
is now worrying urban Muslims and taking on a cosmopolitan face. This 
phenomenon may be seen as a result of tension between the civil Islam 
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characteristics of Indonesian Muslims (Hefner 2000) and the temptation 
toward radicalism (Feillard & Madinier 2011) that is now being experienced 
by the Indonesian middle class within the context of Islamic commercialization 
(Rakhmani 2017). Furthermore, this phenomena emerged as a result of a 
combination between the middle class, tempted to accommodate a populist 
kind of Islam (Hadiz 2014), and the latest generation of puritan/radical 
Islamic activists, who joined the debates on contemporary religious issues 
from within a new medium of propaganda. This characteristic has been the 
most significant aspect in the transformation of the ideology and cultural form 
of the contemporary Islamic movement in Indonesia-media technology. What 
is the socio-historical basis of these phenomena? What is the implication of 
this transformation for the cultural form of the Islamic movement and their 
political effects in the public sphere?
Contemporary Urban Muslims in Indonesia: Socio-Historical Back-
ground of #IndonesiaTanpaJIL Movement
#IndonesiaTanpaJIL is a movement that arose on March 5, 2012, from 
the coalition of various internet-based communities in response to the rise of 
the #IndonesiaTanpaFPI discourse, popularized by liberal-Islam activists in 
Indonesia. The #IndonesiaTanpaJIL movement initially consisted of people 
from various religious backgrounds—adherents of different Islamic ideologies 
such as Hizbut Tahrir, Tarbiyah, Salafi, and even laymen who were only 
starting to develop an interest in Islamic issues. They also came from different 
professions. Notably, most were middle class, and lived in urban centers 
such as Greater Jakarta, Bandung, Solo, and Makassar. In short, most were 
middle-class urban youth. According to their main proponent, Akmal Syafril, 
the initial discussion that brought them together happened on Twitter in late 
2012, started by the popular term “Komunitas Bigot-Bigot Indonesia,” which 
was used to describe them. Connected via the Internet, this group continued 
to conduct their discussions on Twitter and through a mailing list. They all 
share a similar concern: the fear that Western ideologies have infiltrated the 
Islamic community (Ummat) in Indonesia. According to them, this was due 
to the rising stature of public intellectuals who were heavily influenced by 
Western scholars. Most of these intellectuals had been educated in European 
and American universities, and regularly published their Western-influenced 
discourses in the mass media. The term “Bigot” in the group’s name came in 
reaction to the label the “Liberal Islam activists” applied to them because of 
their opinions regarding the role of the State in regulating Islamic religion 
in the public sphere as well as their attitude in social media toward religious 
minorities such as the Ahmadiyah and Syiah in Indonesia. 
Nowadays, the two main figures in the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL movement 
are Hafidz-Ary and Akmal Syafril. Both are graduates of Institut Teknologi 
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Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology). Hafidz-Ary is an alumnus of the 
Salman Mosque organization in ITB, while Akmal only became an Islamic 
activist after he graduated in 2004. Akmal was involved in a series of studies 
developed by Adian Husaini at the Jakarta-based INSIST (Institute of Islamic 
Thought and Civilization) and the University of Ibnu Khaldun, Bogor. INSIST 
is an organization that focuses on Islamized sciences, and its proponents 
openly admit to being influenced by the thoughts and teachings of a Malaysian 
intellectual, Syed Naquib Al Attas.10 In 2013, INSIST leader Adnin Arnas 
actively supported #IndonesiaTanpaJIL members by giving lectures during 
various events organized by the community. Other figures who were strongly 
involved in the first phase of this movement included Onbak from a trash-metal 
music band named Purgatory, and Mehdy, a member of Melody Maker, a band 
in the underground music community that introduced Islamic discourse and 
warned their fan base against the dangers of liberalism. Other artists involved 
included Ucay from the indie-rock band Rocket Rocker, a former host of Asia 
Music Television Broadcasting (MTV station) Arie K Untung and national 
film actor Fauzi Badilah. Along with 50 other members, they were pioneers 
of this social movement condemning the widespread influence of the Jaringan 
Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network) in Indonesia. 
As a Tarbiyah alumni stated, most of the people in the movement who came 
from a non-Islamic activist background had been newly exposed to issues of 
Islam and the threats it is facing in Indonesia, and did not have any form of 
clear connection to Islamic activism. Mehdy and Onbak, who came from the 
underground rock music community, had different historical interests compared 
to Hafidz-Ary or Akmal. They were keen on the conspiracy theory that the 
Illuminati11 and Freemasons12 would conquer Indonesia. These musicians, who 
10. INSIST and Ibnu Khaldun University have a close connection to CASIS (Centre for 
Advanced Studies on Islam, Science, and Civilization) at the UTM (Universiti Teknologi 
Malaysia). CASIS was founded by Professor Dr. Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud who was strongly 
influenced by Syekh Naquib Al Attas’ intellectual perspective on Islam, Western civilization 
and secularism. His perspective identifies the problems of Western civilization and secularism 
influences on Muslim society, which resulted in incompatibility and the violation of Islamic 
ethics (For further details see, Al-Attas, Muhammad Naguib, Islām and secularism, Kuala 
Lumpur, Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, 1978). This idea influenced, INSIST, with 
regard to their critical, and often hostile, argument toward Indonesian liberal Islam activists on 
the subject of Islam, the state, and secularism in Indonesia.
11. Famous among conspiratorialists, Illuminati (plural of Latin illuminatus, “enlightened”) is 
a name given to several groups, both real and fictitious, which are supposedly secret and aim 
to oppose religious influence over public life, and abuses of state power. Historically, the name 
usually refers to the Bavarian Illuminati, an Enlightenment-era secret society founded on 1 May 
1776.
12. Also famous among conspiratorialists, the Freemasons were a secret society that developed 
historically in various regions of Europe, and has been responsible for major political and 
religious events in the world. However, it should be noted that members of Komunitas Salam 
Satu Jari (One Finger Community) have no knowledge of the details of its historical roots and 
are more interested in its connection to Zionism and Liberal Islam in Indonesia. Komunitas 
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belonged to the Komunitas Salam Satu Jari (literally One Finger Movement), 
represented a subset within the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL movement.
Most of the members of Komunitas Salam Satu Jari were recruited from 
clubs frequented by underground music fans in Jakarta—Purgatory, Melody 
Maker, and Tengkorak being the famous bands that were actively involved in 
the community. It also formed close relations with independent clothing and 
apparel distribution companies (distro), such as Islamic Clothes United and 
Mujahid distro, which frequently displayed their products at various Jakarta 
clothing exhibitions. This online organization, which built its network through 
Facebook, mailing lists, and Twitter, was supported by pre-existing networks 
established by punk metal music productions and shows. Some bands regularly 
held Islamic study groups with various Islamic preachers from Pondok Gede 
(Bekasi), Pancoran (South Jakarta), and Cileduk (Tangerang). Their studies 
were usually reflected in their lyrics, band symbols, musical sounds, and 
performances. These were then imitated by the fan base that usually attended 
their performances, with the aim not only to enjoy the music but also to be 
reminded of their religious beliefs and corresponding political attitude toward 
world orders dominated by the threats of universal evils such as Zionism, 
Illuminati, and Freemasons. Their discourse usually replicated that of the 
Intifadah Hamas Movement in their struggle against the Zionists in Palestine. 
They perceived the emergence of JIL activists (whose ideas on national mass 
media are widely published) as confirming their fears. In their eyes, the rise of 
JIL is the manifestation of those universal evil powers in Indonesia; it is aimed 
at weakening the power of Ummat through their political-economic resources. 
Nevertheless, JIL’s emergence also forged a common ground, which they now 
share with their fellows from Tarbiyah (Usroh13 and ROHIS14 alumni).
The defining moment that marked their first affirmative action against 
the universal evils of global power they fear was their organization of the 
#IndonesiaTanpaJIL demonstration. This first offline consolidation happened 
a week after another protest, the #IndonesiaTanpaFPI demonstration, which 
condemned the Islam Defenders Front actions toward Ahmadiyah communities 
in various places in Indonesia. The #IndonesiaTanpaJIL movement came out 
into the public eye for the first time at this demonstration. Members of the Islam 
Salam Satu Jari is a fan community consisting of several underground trash-metal bands in 
Jakarta and other cities in Indonesia that are focused around Islamic values. The bands have 
assembled on the basis of a shared belief in variants of the conspiracy theory about the role of 
Illuminati and Freemasons in degrading the moral life of Muslims in Indonesia.
13. Tarbiyah Movement study groups usually consist of a maximum of five persons, with one 
leader called the murabbi. One group connects with larger groups and creates a system of group 
consolidation. Historically, this movement was born in Egypt under the leadership of Imam 
Hasan Al Banna.
14. This is an acronym for Rohaniawan Islam, an Islamic religious organization at the high-school 
level in Indonesia. It is well known as the place where Tarbiyah/Hizbut Tahrir recruits cadres.
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Defenders Front themselves joined the protest, as well as the Front Ummat 
Islam. Fifty people who previously had mainly interacted through social-media 
platforms such as Twitter and e-mails came together to rally at this offline 
event. One of the ways protesters involved in the demonstration rendered 
themselves visible was by wearing T-shirts printed with #IndonesiaTanpaJIL 
slogans. The design of the T-shirt was markedly popular in its characteristics. 
With their T-shirt and jeans, their appearance stood out in contrast to that of 
their fellow protesters, namely members of the Islam Defenders Front who 
wore Muslim robes. Some of the artists/musicians involved in the movement 
also sported very distinct looks with their mohawk15 and/or other kinds of 
“rockstar” hairstyles.
After the demonstration, they created the Twitter user account @TanpaJIL. 
The name chosen for the account made their main discourse self-explanatory, 
i.e., using social media as a resistance against JIL activists in Indonesia. They 
created a Facebook page under the name #IndonesiaTanpaJIL; on the day 
of the launch, 3,000 people started following the movement’s updates. The 
number rose to 70,000 the very next day. As of May 2014, the Facebook page 
had 57,866 Indonesian followers, while the Twitter account has gained 47,600 
followers. They claim they are an intellectual movement that endeavors 
to unite various Islamist groups in Indonesia through a mutual interest in 
countering liberal Islam in the Indonesian public sphere. 
15. The mohawk (also referred to as a mohican) is a hairstyle in which, in the most common 
variety, both sides of the head are shaven, leaving a strip of noticeably longer hair in the center. 
It is becoming the trademark of punk and rock music identity in Indonesian contemporary 
music lifestyle.
 
Fig. 1 – Fauzi Badillah (center), a famous film star and Akmal Syafril in 
the first demonstration of #IndonesiaTanpaJIL with FPI members (source: 
http://jogjadistromuslim.blogspot.de/2013/04/indonesia-tanpa-jil.html)
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One of the reasons why their Facebook page saw remarkable growth in 
its number of followers was because of their alliance/affiliation with other 
communities such as Komunitas Salam Satu Jari.
The organization structure of this movement was very loose and largely 
depended on urban proponents’ self-initiatives across Indonesia. Those who 
were interested in becoming involved could do so through various venues: 
they could pursue active participation online, attend protests/demonstrations 
or other public actions, organize public lectures in mosques/universities, 
and distribute flyers about the community’s events. A national coordinator 
was elected for the first time in March 2012: he was tasked with managing 
organizational issues and ensuring the increasing in magnitude of the discourse 
through coordination with chapters throughout the country. In 2012, the group 
already had 14 chapters located in several cities in Sumatera, Java, Nusa 
Tenggara Barat, and Sulawesi. As mentioned by the coordinator, they have 
now expanded to 21 chapters nation-wide, which include not just city-based 
chapter groups, but also groups affiliated with higher education institutions 
such as #ITBtanpaJIL. However, we should be aware that the recognition of 
a chapter often only needs few people to be accepted to qualify as a new 
chapter, meaning that some are supported by a weak network base. There are 
no detailed statistics available to confirm the exact number of active members 
who are currently closely involved in this movement, but the Internet traffic 
and social media statistics indeed suggest increasing participation of urban 
youth in their discourses.
#IndonesiaTanpaJIL: Political Consolidation 
The emergence of the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL movement shows that social 
media influence can have a profound impact as online discourse can lead 
to real political consolidation. In the case of this movement, discourse was 
not merely kept confined to long conversations and a series of disputes on 
discussion websites; it also found an outlet in public action. It was translated 
into tangible material for agitation and propaganda of their movement in the 
form of leaflets, websites, YouTube videos, T-shirts, and so on. This propaganda 
was a strategic way of engaging a discourse of mainstream national mass 
media and popular discourse regarding liberal Islam in Indonesia, spread 
through social media. The discourse the movement engaged in was closely 
connected to the latest circulating news on subjects related to the regulation 
of religion and citizenship. Before entering and becoming engaged in public 
debates, some of the members gather discourse material from books, scientific 
journals, university lectures, and TV-show discourse, all of which are available 
to the public. In particular, they pay attention to certain public figures whose 
thoughts on liberal Islam appear frequently in the mainstream mass media, 
especially opinions held by JIL activists.  
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Frequent publications by prominent JIL figures on news websites and 
national magazines and newspapers such as Tempo and Kompas, to promote 
a liberal interpretation of Islamic ideas in Indonesia was arguably the main 
reason why some #IndonesiaTanpaJIL activists came up with their own 
propaganda. The first article that marked the beginning of the movement 
was Ulil Abshar Abdalla’s article in Kompas on November 18, 2002, titled 
“Refreshing Islamic Interpretation.” The article explains the urgency for 
Muslims in Indonesia to open up to alternative interpretations and dialogue, 
and a pluralist attitude in understanding religiosity in Indonesia. This 
particular article reached a wide audience as it was discussed and debated by 
various Islamic community groups via their mailing lists and on websites. As 
JIL’s posture gained momentum, fear developed among #IndonesiaTanpaJIL 
members that the current presentation of Indonesian Islam in the public sphere 
was misleading. This provided #IndonesiaTanpaJIL with a strong rationale to 
start their own movement and focus on political consolidation so as to counter 
JIL’s popular discourse in the mass media. INSIST,16 an institution supported 
by Adian Husaini (also a DDII activist), actively backed Akmal Syafril in 
producing books that respond to the JIL network’s ideas in the mass media 
and on the internet. Jealousy over JIL activists’ popularity when they attain 
positive reputations and gain greater acceptance from social-media users in 
Indonesia seems to give the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL additional momentum. 
In response to the threat of Westernization, the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL 
movement put a lot of thought into the vital aspects of media propaganda 
and handled them with great care. During their first National Congress 
(SilaturahmiNasional ITJ) on the 11th of November 2012, they mentioned 
six media instruments that are important in order to create counter-discourse 
actions to destabilize JIL discourse in social media, as well as in the national 
media. One of their coordinators, Hizbullah, said that:
First, it is imperative to create offline media. Example of offline media forms are saleable 
goods/products like T-shirts, jackets, and others merchandise17 that inform people of our 
social media account and our movement’s name. It’s like branding. The second is print-
mediated output, such as leaflets, pamphlets, and books. Third is media broadcasting 
such as radio shows. We have to persuade radio owners to create our own air-session that 
explains the problem of JIL, just like previously begun by ITJ at Solo. Fourth, is face-to-
face promotion such as appearance in TV talk shows, or events happening in public places 
such as city squares or malls. Fifth, the traditional way is to come to every public event in 
various cities and give out posters and leaflets. Last but not least is online media.18
The media strategy was the result of their seven-month movement evaluation 
16. Most of its founders are affiliated with Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII), which has 
an Islamic revivalist ideological orientation. 
17. The movement prints the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL hashtag on T-Shirt, jackets, and flyers. 
18. Hizbullah, personal observation at the national congress of #IndonesiaTanpaJIL at Cikole, 
Lembang, Bandung, November 11, 2012.
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which began in February 2012. The main problems as well as the potential of 
the movement were identified at the National Congress. #IndonesiaTanpaJIL is 
seriously involved in several aspects of media propaganda. At the ITJ National 
Gathering, they listed six media devices that should be used in an interrelated 
network of discursive circulation and propaganda. This media propaganda 
strategy was built upon reflection and evaluation of the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL 
movement’s previous year’s activities. It identified the potential and the 
problems in their attempt to take over as the public’s voice (“the voice of 
the people”) through social media. It had them consider important strategies. 
All of this also could not be separated from the dynamics of accessing an 
audience in their previous propaganda. The most important lesson, according 
to some informants, could be seen from the response to the coverage by 
Metro TV, a national television station. On September 14, 2012, Metro TV 
broadcasted a report on “Patterns of Young Terrorist Recruitment.” The news 
created restlessness among the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL community, as most of 
its members are from the Tarbiyah Movement and Hizbut-Tahrir. Both recruit 
cadres mostly from mosques and Rohis (Rohaniawan Islam), a formal Islamic 
student organization at high schools, and both were described by Metro TV as 
places for cadre recruitment by terrorist activists.
Another emblematic case, apart from the protest against MetroTV, pertains 
to the Ahmadiyah phenomenon. Intense dissenting public opinions about the 
Ahmadiyahs on social media were first triggered by a demonstration held by 
JIL figures alongside some NGO activists, broadcasted on social media with 
the hashtag #IndonesiaTanpaFPI. In 2012, there was an escalation of violent 
acts against minority groups by the Islam Defenders Front. The issue grew 
out of the violent actions against minority groups such as the Ahmadiyahs, 
the Syiahs, and the Jemaat GerejaYasmeen (a church community in Bogor). 
Pluralist Muslim intellectuals such as Ulil Abshar Abdala, Guntur Romli, 
Nong Mahmada, and Abdul Moqsith, from the traditionalist NU tradition, 
lent their support to this demonstration. They feared the State was leaving the 
regulation of religiosity (especially in relation to Islamic minority groups) to 
radical Islamic groups which had strong connections to the local government in 
several cities in Indonesia such as Bandung, Bogor, Sukabumi, and Kuningan.
The political consolidation of the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL movement was 
triggered by the JIL’s protest against the national government, which did 
nothing to prevent the violence toward the Ahmadiyahs by the FPI in Bandung 
on October 25, 2012, precisely the night of Idul Adha. The following incident 
was the attack on the Syiah community in Sampang, Madura. This different 
interpretation on the role of the State in regulating Islam minority groups in 
Indonesia became the focal point over the conflict. According to the JIL, the 
phenomenon of State support for the ban of the Ahmadiyahs and the Syiahs 
symbolizes a betrayal of the religious freedom guaranteed by the Indonesian 
Constitution. But #IndonesiaTanpaJIL took on another interpretation that 
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related the phenomenon to the fatwa (decree) released by Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia (Ulama Council Indonesia) in 1980, which banned the Ahmadiyahs 
and categorized the group’s teachings and activities as heresy toward the 
Islamic religion. In 2008, the national government released a decree signed by 
three ministries/agencies (Ministry of Religion, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
and the State Attorney) that prohibited the Ahmadiyahs from conducting their 
religious practices. 
The last case, after the polemics surrounding MetroTV news and the 
Ahmadiyahs, was associated with the issue of morality and the acceptance 
of Islamic fashion. For the JIL, the use of the scarf (hijab and jilbab in 
Indonesian) is not an obligation and is a cultural interpretation of the Prophet at 
the time, which could be re-contextualized in different periods. This opinion is 
becoming one of the major discourses that the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL movement 
always problematizes through social media as well as in their public actions. In 
response to the JIL’s discourse on the hijab, #IndonesiaTanpaJIL’s mobilized 
Twitter and Facebook to publicize their reaction. They even printed out the 
tweets from JIL figures on leaflets. On the back of these leaflets, they provided 
a “clarification” to delineate how the Islamic practices of JIL figures were 
actually misleading.  
One example was a leaflet the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL movement created and 
distributed, which featured Luthfi Assyaukanie’s tweet. In a direct statement, he 
had said that the hijab is just like a swimsuit, situational in nature. This statement 
greatly provoked #IndonesiaTanpaJIL activists. In response, the movement 
even captured the whole website page, and linked it to the immoral attitude 
of JIL intellectuals. The issues problematized by the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL 
movement are often not related to the contending interpretations over Islamic 
conceptions toward politics and minority groups, but are usually related to 
JIL tweets which, for some people, are provocations. They emphasize the 
JIL’s immoral attitude and what they perceive as the modern, Western cultural 
lifestyle. Interestingly, #IndonesiaTanpaJIL members also articulated their 
propaganda based on the appropriation of Western cultural elements, such as 
hip-hop, fashion styles, and the growing, significant trend of using English in 
#IndonesiaTanpaJIL propaganda tweets.
The cases above show the dynamics of counter-discourse in social media, 
and its effect on public action and protests against state or mass-media 
institutions. These changes have brought about a new form of Islamic protest, 
and new models for urban youth. The implications of this changing Islamic 
religious movement are located in the change in the religious-group mode 
of authority and in the sites of struggle, along with their logic of political 
participation. The continuity and transformation of the Islamic movement’s 
cultural forms follow the infrastructure and its socio-political contexts. 
In Indonesia, the relations between media-technology evolution, political 
Contemporary Islamic Movement, Popular Culture and Public Sphere in Indonesia 163
Archipel 95, Paris, 2018
changes, and the dynamics within religious and ethnic groups brought subjects 
into new spheres of socio-religious life, a whole new terrain of identity (Lim 
2004). The latest issues that have arisen from this rapid mediated discourse 
and its contestation indicate the rising discourse of fear among middle-class 
urban youth and younger Islamic activists in Indonesia, particularly regarding 
the presence of popular JIL activists and other secular political figures in 
cyberspace, as well as in urban public spaces such as the national media and 
state universities. 
Popular Culture, Social Media, and Counter-discourse of #Indonesia-
TanpaJIL
The disputes and polemics in social media and public action influenced 
#IndonesiaTanpaJIL to create their own public sphere, based on their own 
interpretation, which borrowed from various narratives such as the history of 
the Ummat, citizenship issues, and contemporary popular culture. Political 
Islam activists, middle-class artists, and urban entrepreneurs from Jakarta and 
Bandung, brought together through #IndonesiaTanpaJIL, are playing with 
revivalist-Islamic discourse and notions of nationalism/citizenship through 
Indonesian urban pop-culture materiality and market-oriented public spaces. 
The appropriation of religiosity, citizenship, popular-culture discourse and its 
 
Fig. 2 – A liberal Islam tweet captured through a mobile phone. The image was distributed 
widely amongst #IndonesiaTanpaJIL members
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materiality has created a religious ideology and piety that is articulated in 
urban public spaces such as (city/town) squares, malls, and high schools. Since 
2012, the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL movement has organized a series of events. In 
these cases, social-media accounts and blog posts have been (and continue to 
be) used by #IndonesiaTanpaJIL activists in their public actions and serve as 
a means to attract the public, through popular culture elements such as music, 
celebrity endorsements, gadgets, fashion, and the Internet. 
The first move that the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL movement made to engage 
popular urban culture/lifestyle was to attend a radio talk on Hard Rock FM 
Jakarta. Pandji,19 a well-known radio anchor, invited Akmal as a speaker. 
Akmal was asked to explain the problems liberal Islam presented for Indonesia. 
Pandji also invited JIL activists to the radio show, but their representative 
failed to turn up at the studio. The talk mostly covered the issue of religious 
pluralism and the JIL’s morally loose interpretations of religion and modern 
public life. The story of the JIL’s refusal to meet at the studio was then 
repeated at every #IndonesiaTanpaJIL meeting. The movement’s following 
step was to interview supportive Indonesian celebrities, and upload the video 
interviews on YouTube. Famous actor Fauzi Badillah was among the national 
celebrities who lent their support, to the extent that he attended a public 
event the movement hosted at Dago Square, Bandung. The participation of 
the underground music community was enlisted as it boosted support to the 
movement through its influence on the urban youth. Famous underground 
rock bands such as Purgatory, Melody Maker, and Tengkorak (joined together 
under the banner association of the One Finger Community) also actively took 
part in some of the public actions organized by the community.
No. Username Followers Following Profile
1 @FatinSL 1557465 4534 Idol contest winner in 2013. Represents young Muslim popular idols wearing the hijab.
2 @Dewisandra 1460206 753 Former artist and singer who, in 2012, started wearing the hijab.
3 @Yusufmansyur 1415247  9 Young and famous ustadz/preacher
19. Pandji Pragiwaksono is now famous in Indonesian social media as the leading campaigner 
of Anies Baswedan-Sandiaga Uno, candidate during the 2017 DKI Jakarta governor election. 
He was often labelled by the Ahok campaign team as a person who was complicit in the fascist 
and anti-Sino-Indonesians (also anti-China) propaganda of Anies-Sandi supporters during the 
campaign period.
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No. Username Followers Following Profile
4 @aagym 1124041 28 Famous preacher and Islamic entrepreneur
5 @ArieKuntung 942981 954 Former MTV video jockey/video host. Famous talk-show host on Indonesian national television
6 @teukuwisnu2 861468 1249 Famous soap opera artist (Sinetron)
7 @Felixsiauw 851279 318 Famous preacher and self-motivator facilitator. Affiliated with HizbutTahrir.
8 @MaherZein 845580 64 Famous hip-hop and RnB artist
9 @salimafillah 218178 806 Famous preacher from the Tarbiyah Movement and PKS
10 @ALakaUCAY 50415 2911 Former band member of Rocketrockers, punk band from Jakarta
11 @Anggiumbara 16665 1081 Movie director
12 @fauzibaadilla 1380 228 Film actor
 
Table 1 – List of public figures and celebrities of the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL movement with the number of 
their “followers” and “following” in November 2012 (retrieved in 2012 by the author through NodXL 
software application on data from Twitter)
In the following months, the association of fashion distros with Islamic 
labels such as Islamic Clothes United, Syarikat Kreatifiyah Indonesia, 
Mujahid Distro, and HijaberstanpaJIL joined the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL 
movement by supporting them in merchandise production, as well as creative 
design competition. Most of the content combined the form of popular culture 
such as Japanese Manga and the terms/cultural expression of contemporary 
popular culture. The introduction of an Islamic interpretation then circulated 
not only through social media but also through the consumption of material 
merchandise/products. The discourse is thus embedded in what they hear 
(music), what they wear, and what they do (public action). Their actions, 
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Fig. 3 – #IndonesiaTanpaJIL Comics Distributed through Social Media
Contemporary Islamic Movement, Popular Culture and Public Sphere in Indonesia 167
Archipel 95, Paris, 2018
which involve all of these materials, can be seen in their various recorded 
videos on YouTube. Presently there are 30 videos,20 including promotional 
videos, event documentation, and taped past-event talk shows.  
On October 28, 2012, the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL movement hosted a public-
action event at the main square of Depok, a town located to the south of Jakarta. 
The meeting was attended by participants who represented various groups of 
the Islamic community such as Underground Tauhid, Ghuroba Militant Chapter 
Depok, and Tim Peduli Jilbab. Most of the participants came from the Greater 
Jakarta area and represented activists from Jakarta, Tangerang, Bekasi, and 
Bogor. Their first action was to hand out flyers explaining the danger of liberal 
Islam in Indonesia. The event was hosted by two major figures: Hafidz Ary and 
Akmal Syafril. Having brought a high-performance sound system to the square, 
they gave a public lecture on the dangers of liberal Islam. Next on the agenda was 
a speech delivered by a professional master of ceremony (MC) from an event-
organizing company, with the Twitter user account @Okitronic. Mahar Zein’s 
songs and songs from Islamic hip-hop bands from Bandung and Jakarta were 
played. After the discussion, half-circle lines were formed —males and females 
being separated into different lines— and the pledge “SumpahPemudaTanpa 
JIL” was made. Galih, the Depok coordinator of this movement, read the 
pledge that was created by the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL community in Solo, on his 
20.  https://www.youtube.com/user/IndonesiaTanpaJIL
 
Fig. 4 – Facebook Page of #IndonesiaTanpaJILOrganization PartnerKomunitas Salam Satu Jari (One 
Finger Community) Music Movement
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Blackberry:
1. We are the Islamic Youth of Indonesia; acknowledge one motherland, Indonesia, 
without Islamic Liberal network.
2. We are the Islamic Youth of Indonesia; acknowledge one nation, the nation of 
Indonesia, without Islamic Liberal groups.
3. We are the Islamic Youth of Indonesia; uphold the language of unity, Indonesian, with 
the spirits of Tauhid.
Galih, the coordinator of the event, then shouted “Merdeka” (Freedom). 
This was followed by a shout of collective Syahadat from all the participants, 
who pointed their fingers to the sky as a symbol of their belief in the one 
single truth of Islam. News of this action spread all over Indonesia and was 
spread at the regency level. Sequences from this public action were recorded 
with digital cameras. A few days later, a video of the event was uploaded onto 
YouTube, and DVDs were circulated to other members all over Indonesia. 
The video starts with a statement of Tarbiyah activist @Salimafillah: “Youth 
is always charming and amazing, even when they sleep they can make social 
change, but the social change will be more powerful when they are awake.”
This public action showcases how public performance in urban space, 
with new fashion styles and use of gadgets, is becoming important for 
 
Fig. 5 – Poster of the #HijaberTanpaJILEvent inviting Rising Middle-class Muslims  
in Jakarta to attend their Talk Show
Contemporary Islamic Movement, Popular Culture and Public Sphere in Indonesia 169
Archipel 95, Paris, 2018
#IndonesiaTanpaJIL. The Internet, high-tech mobile phones, the latest fashion 
trends, and a Westernized soundscape are part of their strategy to reach 
out and gain a larger urban-youth following in major Indonesian cities. In 
another case, they created a booth at the clothes festival in Jakarta, selling 
their merchandise, handing out flyers, and recording videos featuring national 
celebrities who supported them.
The changing approach to Islamic discourse circulation and the experiences 
of Western popular culture among various members of the #IndonesiaTanpaJIL 
movement provide us with new portraits of the radical Islamic movement in 
Indonesia. The urban youth as the target audience and the new urban context 
that is usually located at the center of circulation of commodities and urban 
consumption forced this aspect of the movement to adapt to a new situation. The 
polarization within the movement was visible at the National Congress, which 
was marked by the attendance of divergent groups that somehow influenced 
each other (entrepreneurs, musicians, cultural industry workers and the 
 
Fig.  6 - #IndonesiaTanpaJIL T-shirt
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younger generation of revivalist groups). The tensions within radicalism thus 
appeared in the form of the diverse appearances of the Congress participants; 
nevertheless, there was a salient convergence in their conservative attitudes 
toward pluralism. 
Conclusion
The context of a post-authoritarian society, new media technology, 
and rising consumer culture have opened up a new way of interpreting 
Islam, nationhood, and identity among new activists of political Islam. The 
#IndonesiaTanpaJIL political mobilization clearly shows that this new social 
and urban landscape in Indonesia has influenced the way Islamic identity is 
being exercised in the public sphere. It is apparent that most of the public 
actions conducted by the contemporary Islamic movement are always related 
to their social media discourse, and are presented through mass action with 
a variety of performances and popular culture attributes, which are actually 
brought in by the new creative cultural industry in contemporary Indonesia. 
This phenomenon shows how religiously-conservative popular expression 
of identity has been shaped by a secular form of popular culture in urban 
Indonesia. The phenomenon has a significant impact on the understanding of 
political religious performance in Indonesia: as being exercised through the 
ambivalence between popular forms and moral-religious discourse. 
Social media and the rising economy of the cultural industry are the 
main factors in the transformation of the way Islamic activists produce, 
circulate, and consume cultural discourse regarding Islamic values and 
its relationship with the nation-state. This article reveals a continuity of 
old, conservative Islamic discourse in discontinuity with regard to its form 
of cultural attributes. Different segments and generations of Islamists are 
flourishing through the spread of this movement and are influencing the form 
and tactics of the contemporary Islamic movement in Indonesia. The close 
link between online and offline experiences is important in the circulation of 
the fear of liberalism and, at the same time, in the incorporation of Western 
popular culture. This ambivalence indicates that to understand the dynamics 
of religiosity in contemporary Indonesia, there is a need to elaborate on the 
fluid characteristics of the sacred/religious in the secular space and vice versa 
in the contemporary Indonesian public sphere. In contemporary Indonesia, 
the trend toward radicalism is always, at the same time, articulated within 
the social force that tends to de-radicalize its cultural form as a consequence 
of market incorporation of religious symbols, identity, and practices, which, 
surprisingly, always emerge from social media.
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